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1. INTRODUCTION  
The traditional understanding and conceptualisation of the right to abortion as a privacy or 
autonomy right has largely forgotten to capture and analyse the different discriminations 
created at the intersections. Identities are complex and multi-faceted and international human 
rights law must evolve in order to incorporate an intersectional perspective able to apprehend 
such diverse realities.   
In an attempt to propose a change in the way we understand the issue of abortion rights in 
relation to adolescence from an intersectional perspective that takes into account, at least, three 
different grounds which are sex, age and pregnancy, in this dissertation we argue that abortion 
is not a question of privacy (or, at least, not primarily a question of privacy) and that what is 
more, it is actually counterproductive to frame abortion rights as privacy rights in the case of 
adolescent girls.  
The main aim of this work is to design an adaptable an effective theoretical framework in order 
to develop alternative litigation strategies in girls’ abortion rights cases. To this end, we have 
first and foremost formulated three essential research questions which will essentially guide 
our research and structure the dissertation we are now presenting. The three research questions 
are the following:  
1. What has been the traditional approach when litigating for girls’ abortion rights? The 
traditional approach focused on privacy or autonomy will be explored in Chapter 2.  
2. How have childhood studies and feminist legal theory addressed and analysed the right 
to abortion, childhood and pregnancy? This question will be analysed in Chapter 3.  
3. What are the elements of a litigation strategy that takes into account an intersectional 
approach to abortion rights for girls in the cases when they are denied abortion? This 
last question will be explored in Chapter 4.  
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The research methods we will be using are mainly doctrinal research, literature review and case 
law analysis and interpretation.  
As it will be seen in the final chapter of the dissertation, the three elements that compose our 
litigation strategy are the prohibition of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, 
the prohibition of discrimination and the girl’s best interests.  
In cases where adolescent girls have expressed their wish to terminate their pregnancies, the 
denial or imposition of barriers to accessing abortion care constitutes firstly a form of torture 
or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment given the health, socioeconomic and 
educational consequences associated to child pregnancy and that they generally do not have 
the capacity of implementing their decisions (this is closely connected, as we will see to the 
powerlessness requirement in the definition of torture), especially if they differ from those of 
their parents. Secondly, it constitutes an act of intersectional discrimination based on, at least, 
the three above-listed grounds which interact potentially creating shared experiences of 
oppression and marginalisation.  
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2. THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO ADOLESCENT GIRLS’ ABORTION 
RIGHTS LITIGATION  
This chapter will analyse how litigation strategies concerning adolescent girls’ abortion rights 
have been traditionally designed around the right to privacy or (reproductive) autonomy, failing 
to apply an intersectional analysis, and therefore, failing to identify and understand what 
specific barriers adolescent girls face in claiming and exercising their right to abortion.  
Even though, as Zampas and Gher point out, the right to abortion is arguably integral to a 
constellation of other human rights such as the right to life, health, physical integrity and liberty 
and security of the person among others1, it has been mainly framed in terms of privacy 
protections. This privacy or autonomy approach has predominantly been adopted at the 
international, regional and national levels.  
The emphasis on women’s and girls’ reproductive autonomy is derived from the biological 
connection between their bodies, sexuality and reproduction.2 The autonomy approach, which 
comprises the principle of ‘‘bodily integrity’’, rests on the notion that women and girls must 
be able to control their own bodies and the reproductive and sexual uses to which these are 
put.3 That is why reproductive rights advocates, not in vain called ‘‘pro-choicers’’, have 
historically placed a lot of emphasis on ‘‘the right to choose’’. To this day, together with foetal 
claims on the right to life, the ‘‘my body, my rules’’ mantra still shapes the abortion debate in 
every country.  
In the first section of this chapter, we will explore and discuss the long-standing tension in 
feminist legal theory between two apparently opposing ideas in relation to abortion rights4: 
                                                 
1 Christina Zampas and Jaime M. Gher, ‘Abortion as a Human Right – International and Regional Standards’ 
(2008) 8,2 Human Rights Law Review 251  
2 Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, Abortion and a Woman’s Choice. The State, Sexuality and Reproductive Freedom 
(Northeastern University Press 1990) 2 
3 Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, ‘Reproductive Freedom: Beyond ‘‘A Woman’s Right to Choose’’ (1980) 5, 4 Signs. 
Women: Sex and Sexuality 662 
4 Pollack Petchesky (n 3) 662 
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equality and autonomy. Arguments rejecting the excessive focus on latter in the case of 
adolescent girls will also be presented. In the second section, we will focus on the evolution of 
litigation strategies in relation to adolescent girls’ right to abortion by considering said right 
under the lens of different and already recognised human rights. Three cases in particular, one 
of the ECtHR (P and S v. Poland), another of the CEDAW Committee (L.C. v. Peru) and 
another one of the HRC (K.L. v Peru) will help us illustrate this evolution. These three leading 
cases embody albeit in different ways abortion rights’ traditional conceptualisation as 
autonomy or privacy rights, which as we will see can be considered detrimental to the 
realisation of adolescent girls’ right to abortion.  
 
2.1. Abortion: is it a question of privacy or equality?  
Two political and philosophical ideas have informed historically and still today the movement 
for reproductive freedom.5 These two essential ideas are, broadly speaking, autonomy and 
equality.  
In the landmark decision Roe v. Wade, the United States Supreme Court established a woman’s 
‘‘fundamental’’ right to abortion.6 The Court anchored this right to a concept of personal 
autonomy derived from the due process guarantee7 by essentially affirming that the right to 
privacy was ‘broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her 
pregnancy’.8 Similarly, in Tysiąc v. Poland, the first decision of the European Court of Human 
Rights on abortion, the Court confirmed that ‘‘private life’’ is a broad term, encompassing, 
inter alia, ‘aspects of an individual’s physical and social identity including the right to personal 
autonomy, personal development and to establish and develop relationships with other human 
                                                 
5 Pollack Petchesky (n 3) 662 
6 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)  
7 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, ‘Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade’ (1985) 63, 2 
North Carolina Law Review 381  
8 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) 153  
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beings and the outside world’.9 As it becomes apparent in these two cases, the right to abortion 
has been traditionally linked to the rights and principles of personal autonomy, privacy and 
sometimes more specifically to the right to bodily integrity, which could essentially be 
considered the ‘grounded application of the more ethereal duty to respect autonomous 
decisions’.10  
The autonomy approach has tended to emphasise, as Pollack Petchesky notes, the individual 
dimensions of reproduction by appealing to a ‘‘fixed level’’ level of the biological person.11 
Simply put, a woman has the right to choose to continue or end her pregnancy basically because 
she has the right to control her own body and the procreative capacities it possesses.  
However politically compelling it may be, an approach based solely on autonomy is both 
insufficient and problematic12 and even more so when discussing adolescent girls’ right to 
abortion.  
Firstly, it seems quite clear that reproductive freedom begins at women’s and girls’ bodies, but 
the question is, where does it end? The very nature of reproduction is individual and social at 
the same time.13 It is therefore not only a biological activity, but also social activity that 
certainly has the potential to restrict women and girls’ ability to participate in society on equal 
footing with men.14 Firestone has even gone so far as to sustain that it is a woman or a girl’s 
‘reproductive biology that accounted for her original and continued oppression’.15  
Girls’ ‘‘choices’’ over sexuality, reproduction and motherhood are exercised in a specific 
social, political, cultural and legal context, or in other words, in a framework in which sexuality, 
                                                 
9  Tysiąc v. Poland App no. 5410/03 (ECtHR, 20 March 2007) para. 107  
10 Jonathan Herring and Jesse Wall, ‘The Nature and Significance of the Right to Bodily Integrity’ (2017) 76, 3 
Cambridge Law Journal 577  
11 Pollack Petchesky (n 3) 663 
12 Pollack Petchesky (n 2) 6-7 
13 Pollack Petchesky (n 3) 663 
14 Katha Pollit, Pro: Reclaiming Abortion Rights (Picador 2015) 20  
15 Shulamith Firestone, The Dialectic of Sex: The Case for a Feminist Revolution (Bantam Books (1970) 73  
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reproduction and motherhood have determined their relationship to society16, the State and 
their parents. The issues that have been conceptualised in terms of women’s or girls’ choices 
or bodies actually involve questions concerning their expected roles.17   
Proponents of a sex equality approach understand reproduction as ‘‘socially gendered’’18 and 
therefore, believe that the rhetoric of privacy prevents us from considering ‘the socio-political 
forces which produce both involuntary pregnancies and calls for abortion access, and constrain 
the ‘‘choices’’ of different women in different contexts’.19 As MacKinnon eloquently explains 
it  
‘[w]omen [and especially girls] often do not control the conditions under which they 
become pregnant; systematically denied meaningful control over the reproductive uses 
of their bodies through sex, it is exceptional when they do. Women are socially 
disadvantaged in controlling sexual access to their bodies through socialization to 
customs that define a woman's body as for sexual use by men.’20  
In essence, the idea of privacy impedes us from seeing the obvious: it is women and girls who 
are oppressed when abortion access is denied or hindered21, oppression which comes from 
simply happening to be a woman or a girl.  
Secondly, conceptualising the right to abortion as a privacy or autonomy right reinforces the 
private/public dichotomy, ‘central to almost two centuries of feminist writing and political 
struggle’.22 In liberal political tradition, personal autonomy defines the boundaries of state 
                                                 
16 Pollack Petchesky (n 3) 677 
17 Reva B. Siegel, ‘Abortion as a Sex Equality Right: Its Basis in Feminist Theory’ in Marta Fineman and Isabel 
Karpin (eds.) Mothers in Law: Feminist Theory and the Legal Regulation of Motherhood (Columbia University 
Press 1995) 45 
18 Catharine A. MacKinnon, ‘Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law’ (1991) 100, 5 Yale Law Journal 1313  
19 Lisa Smyth, ‘Feminism and abortion politics: choice, rights and reproductive freedom’ (2002) 25, 3 Women’s 
Studies International Forum 336 
20 MacKinnon (n 17) 1312  
21 Sylvia Law, ‘Rethinking Sex and the Constitution’ (1984) 132 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1020 
22 Carole Pateman, ‘Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Dichotomy’ in Carole Pateman, The Disorder of 
Women. Democracy, Feminism and Political Theory (Stanford University Press 1989) 118  
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interference. In demarcating the private sphere, free by definition (or at least, free for some), 
the State has centred ‘its self-restraint on body and home [and] especially bedroom’.23 
Although both the public and the private sphere are controlled by adult men, the latter has 
become one of ‘sanctified isolation, impunity and unaccountability’.24 In addition to activities 
in the private sphere being valued less, the private sphere receives little or in certain occasions 
no international and domestic protection, leaving women and children, particularly girls, 
vulnerable to abuse and marginalisation.25 That is why, according to MacKinnon, men’s right 
to privacy or ‘‘to be let alone’’ exists to protect the unequal distribution of power within this 
private sphere.26 The problem with the privacy doctrine is that ‘while the private has been a 
refuge for some, it has been a hellhole for others, often at the same time’. 27  
Thirdly, grounding the right to abortion on autonomy protections can be counterproductive 
when focusing on the specific case of adolescent girls. Apart from all that has been previously 
mentioned, it is important to be aware that the tension between autonomy and protection lies 
at the very heart of international child law. Although these principles are understood as 
mutually reinforcing28, in the sense that protection becomes ‘necessary in order to develop 
autonomy and autonomy is necessary to ensure protection’29, the truth is that is difficult to 
ignore that historically focus has been largely placed on children’s protection.30 It is mostly in 
the name of protection, that both the State and the family, and more specifically, adult men in 
                                                 
23 Catherine MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Harvard University Press 1989) 187 
24 MacKinnon (n 18) 1311 
25 Ladan Askari, 'Girl's Rights under International Law: An Argument for Establishing Gender Equality as a Jus 
Cogens' (1998) 8 Southern California Review of Law and Women's Studies 23  
26 MacKinnon (n 23) 193  
27 MacKinnon (n 18) 1311  
28 CRC, General Comment No. 12 (2009). The right of the child to be heard (1 July 2009) UN Doc CRC/C/GC/12 
para. 74 
29 Gerison Lansdown and Marie Wernham, ‘Understanding Young People’s Right to Decide. Are protection and 
autonomy opposing concepts?’ (2012) IPPF 2 
  <http://createsolutions.org/docs/resources/IPPFprotection_autonomy.pdf> accessed 1st of August 2019  
30 Anna Holzscheiter, Children’s Rights in International Politics: The Transformative Power of Discourse 
(Palgrave Macmillan 2010) 116  
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the family, intervene to limit or control girls’ decisions. It is due to the intersectional 
discrimination pregnant adolescent girls suffer (they are discriminated against on the basis, at 
least, of their age, sex and pregnancy) that they have less ability and control to make decisions 
about their pregnancies, abortions and sexuality. The legal instrument par excellence that 
allows parental intervention in girls’ abortion decisions are parental notification and consent 
laws, present today in the United States (some federal states), Italy, Spain, Greece, Turkey, 
Uruguay or Norway, countries where we could say there are liberal abortion policies and laws 
in place.31  In Chapter 3 all this will be analysed more in depth.  
Fourthly and finally, it is important to build a strong discourse to counter-act the powerful 
discursive tools anti-abortion advocacy has developed. As Pollitt asserts, the anti-abortion 
movement has managed ‘to colonise the word ‘‘life’’, which is a very big, resonant and 
powerful word’.32 The dangerous consequence is that in doing so they have casted the other 
side as ‘‘pro-death’’.33 ‘‘Choice’’ represents after all no match against ‘‘life’’. That is why the 
autonomy approach is not really providing a sustaining discursive framework to advocate for 
abortion rights.  
 
  
                                                 
31 Center for Reproductive Rights, The World Abortion Laws Map (2019) (multimedia resource) 
<https://reproductiverights.org/worldabortionlaws> accessed 20th July 2019  
32 Marie Solis, ‘How Anti-Abortion Rhetoric Shapes Pro-Choice Advocacy’ Vice (2 April 2019) < 
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/qvyy9w/history-of-pro-choice-pro-life-abortion-discourse> accessed 15th 
July 2019   
33 ibid  
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2.2. The evolution of strategic litigation for adolescent girls’ abortion rights  
The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women 
in Africa, known as the Maputo Protocol, provides in its Article 14(2)(c) that States Parties 
shall take all the appropriate measures ‘to protect the reproductive rights of women by 
authorising medical abortion in cases of sexual assault, rape, incest, and where continued 
pregnancy endangers the mental and physical health of the mother or the life of the mother or 
the foetus.’34  
By inscribing for the first time a fundamental right to abortion in a binding treaty, Article 14 
has broken new ground in international human rights law.35 Unsurprisingly, the Protocol does 
not mention girls, although as indicated by its drafters the word women ‘means persons of 
female gender, including girls’.36  
With the exception of Article 14 of the Maputo Protocol, a general right to abortion has never 
expressly been recognised in the international legal system.37 Nevertheless, the right to abortion 
has been bolstered by a broad range of human rights that support it.38 Adolescent girls’ right to 
abortion, just as women’s right to abortion, has been conceptualised as part of other already 
enshrined human rights. By looking specifically into three cases, P and S v. Poland (ECtHR), 
L.C. v Peru (CEDAW Committee) and K.L v. Peru (HRC) we will now examine all these 
different conceptualisations of the right to abortion.  
 
2.2.1. The right to privacy  
                                                 
34 African Union, Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women in 
Africa (2003) Art. 14(2)(c) 
35 Charles G. Ngwena, ‘Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women: Implications for access to 
abortion at the regional level’ (2010) 110 International Journal of Gynecology and Obstetrics 163  
36 Maputo Protocol Art. 1 k)  
37 Ronli Sifris, Reproductive Freedom, Torture and International Human Rights: Challenging the Masculinisation 
of Torture (Routledge 2014) 114  
38 Zampas and Gher (n 1) 251  
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The right to privacy or to private and family life in the case of the European regional system, 
represents the traditional approach to strategic litigation in relation to adolescent girls’ abortion 
rights. Although the issue of abortion has been discussed from a myriad of perspectives39, in 
both P and S v. Poland and K.L v. Peru the primary focus is on the right to privacy, which as 
we have already argued, becomes problematic in the case of adolescent girls. In the case of 
L.C. v. Peru, the CEDAW precludes this possibility, given that the convention does not contain 
such a provision.  
In P and S v. Poland, the ECtHR (or the Court) addressed the human rights violations resulting 
from hospital staff and clergy members severely obstructing P’s access to abortion services. At 
the age of 14, P was raped and as a result became pregnant. Although in Poland it is lawful to 
get an abortion if the pregnancy results from a crime40, as it is the case, and although she 
ultimately obtained it, P and S, her mother, faced multiple obstacles and pressures to carry the 
pregnancy to term. At the first hospital they visited in Lublin, for instance, S was asked to sign 
a declaration acknowledging that the procedure could lead to her daughter’s death and P was 
forced to talk with a Catholic priest who tried to convince her to not get an abortion. At the 
second hospital, in Warsaw, after P’s confidential information was leaked to the press, both P 
and her mother were harassed by anti-abortion activists.  
The Court found that the facts of the case gave rise to a breach of Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), for two reasons, the obstruction of access to abortion 
services and the disclosure of the applicants’ personal and medical information. We will only 
focus on the first one.  
Article 8 of the ECHR establishes the right to respect for private and family life. The essential 
object of this Article is to protect the individual against arbitrary or unlawful state 
                                                 
39 Ronli Sifris, ‘Restrictive regulation of abortion and the right to health’ (2010) 18 Medical Law Review 185 
40 Section 4 (a)(1)(3) of the Family Planning, Human Embryo Protection and Conditions of Permissibility of 
Abortion Act of 7 January 1993 
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interference.41 Although this obligation is defined as the classic negative kind, States also have 
positive obligations deriving from Article 8.42 It is precisely under a positive obligation that 
the State must ‘create a procedural framework enabling a pregnant woman [or girl] to 
effectively exercise her right of access to lawful abortion’.43 The existing legal framework in 
Poland cannot, therefore, limit real possibilities of obtaining an abortion.44  
The Court has clearly affirmed that Article 8 cannot be interpreted as conferring a right to 
abortion.45 Nevertheless, the broad notion of ‘‘private life’’ has been considered to apply to 
both decisions to have or not to have children.46 The question that follows is in P’s case is who 
makes said decisions? The Court interpreted that the legal setting in Poland did not allow for 
P’s mother, S’s views to be truly respected and balanced against the interests of her pregnant 
daughter. Consequently, while it affirmed that ‘proper regard must be had to the minor’s 
personal autonomy’47 in relation to abortion, it determined that a procedure whereby both 
parties can be heard and their views considered must have been in place. So, the Court is of the 
opinion that these interests, which in some cases may be different and competing (although this 
was not the case) must be both taken into consideration and balanced.  
In the case of K.L. v. Peru, the HRC analysed the human rights violations stemming from 
hospital staff denying K.L, a 17-year-old adolescent girl, the access to abortion services. K.L. 
was pregnant with an anencephalic foetus. Doctors confirmed that the foetus would likely be 
born without major portions of its brain leading to stillbirth or death, which clearly posed risks 
to K.L.’s life. Although Peruvian abortion laws allow abortion when the life or health of the 
                                                 
41 P and S v. Poland App no. 57375/08 (ECtHR, 30 October 2012) para. 94  
42 European Court of Human Rights, ‘Guide on Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Right to 
respect for private and family life, home and correspondence’ (2019) 
<https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_8_ENG.pdf> 8 accessed 10th August 2019  
43 P and S v. Poland (n 39) para. 99 and Tysiąc v. Poland App no. 5410/03 (ECtHR, 20 March 2007) paras. 116-
124  
44 P and S v. Poland (n 39) para. 99 
45 ibid para. 96  
46 Evans v. The United Kingdom App no. 6339/05 (ECtHR, 10 April 2007) para. 71  
47 P and S v. Poland (n 39) para. 109 
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mother is in danger (therapeutic abortion)48, she was denied abortion and consequently forced 
to carry her pregnancy to term and breastfeed her for the four days she managed to survive. 
Among others, the HRC found a violation of Article 17 of the ICCPR which establishes the 
right to respect of privacy, family, home and correspondence. In her complaint to the HRC, 
K.L. sustains that Article 17 objective is to protect ‘(…) women from interference in decisions 
which affect their bodies and their lives, and offers them the opportunity to exercise their right 
to make independent decisions on their reproductive lives’.49 The Peruvian State arbitrarily 
interfered in her private life, ‘taking on her behalf a decision relating to her life and 
reproductive health which obliged her to carry [the] pregnancy to term’.50  
 
2.2.2. The right to health  
L.C. was a 13-year-old Peruvian girl who had been raped since the age of 11. As a result, she 
became pregnant and, desperate and depressed, attempted to commit suicide by jumping from 
a building. She was left quadriplegic and emergency surgery was required. But after finding 
out she was pregnant, during psychological and gynaecological examinations prior to the 
surgery, a doctor informed L.C.’s mother that L.C.’s surgery was postponed. The mother then 
requested hospital officials a therapeutic abortion for her daughter. Later, L.C. miscarried 
spontaneously and she was finally operated for her spinal injuries almost three and one half 
months after the surgery had been considered necessary. L.C.’s family could not afford the 
rehabilitation services and currently she is paralysed from the neck down having only regained 
partial movement of her hands. She requires constant care and she had to stop attending school.  
                                                 
48 Penal Code of Peru (1992) Article 119  
49 HRC, K.L. v. Peru, Communication No 1153/2003, UN Doc HRC CCPR/C/85/D/1153/2003 para. 3.6 
50 ibid 
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In this case, the CEDAW Committee’s first case on abortion, the CEDAW Committee found 
that the refusal by the medical staff to perform the therapeutic abortion violated, among others, 
L.C.’s right to health.  
The right to health has been expressly recognised in the ICESCR, the CEDAW and the CRC. 
And even though this right is not listed among ICCPR’s provisions, in K.L. v. Peru, the HRC 
‘addressed the intersections of health, privacy rights and the right to be free from inhumane 
and degrading treatment and called for a broad reading of health exceptions under a state’s 
abortion law’.51  
The right to health can be said to include, as a sub-category, the right to reproductive health.52 
The incorporation of the right to reproductive health to the international legal discourse has 
been a rather recent phenomenon.53 The 1994 Report of the International Conference on 
Population and Development held in Cairo called upon government ‘to deal with the health 
impact of unsafe abortion as a major public health concern’.54 It further stated that ‘in 
circumstances where abortion is not against the law, such abortion should be safe [and] in all 
cases, women should have access to quality services for the management of complications 
arising from abortion.’55 At the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, just a year 
later (1995), the international community reaffirmed said commitment and specifically 
highlighted how ‘unsafe abortions threaten the lives of a large number of women, representing 
a grave public health problem as it is primarily the poorest and youngest who take the highest 
                                                 
51 Zampas and Gher (n 1) 269 
52 Sifris (n 37) 193  
53 ibid  
54 UNDP, Report of the International Conference on Population and Development (18 October 1994) UN Doc 
A/51/950 para. 8.25 
55 ibid 
 18 
risk’.56 The Beijing Platform of Action also recognised adolescents’ vulnerability due to ‘their 
lack of information and access to relevant services in most countries’.57 
According to Article 12(1) of the CEDAW, ‘States Parties shall take all appropriate measures 
to eliminate discrimination against women in the field of health care in order to ensure, on a 
basis of equality of men and women, access to health care services, including those related to 
family planning’.58 In the case of L.C., as the CEDAW Committee noted, owing to her 
condition as pregnant ‘‘woman’’59, she did not have access ‘to an effective and accessible 
procedure allowing her to establish her entitlement to the medical services that her physical 
and mental condition required’.60 The case of L.C. is thus a matter of accessibility of a medical 
procedure which is legally, although not practically, available to her.61 
After examining the facts, the CEDAW Committee considered that the medical board of the 
hospital denied her abortion services alleging that her life was not in danger, but in doing so, 
they did not consider the damage to her health, both her physical and mental health and they 
essentially based their decision on the stereotypical assumption that the protection of the foetus 
should prevail over the health of the pregnant woman or girl.62  
In relation to mental health specifically, the CEDAW Committee in its decision took into 
account three different factors.63 One was the suicide attempt, which was clearly ‘a 
demonstration of the amount of mental suffering she had experienced’64, another one was her 
age and another one was her status as a victim of sexual abuse. As the CEDAW Committee 
                                                 
56 Beijing Platform for Action 2005, UN Doc A/CONF.177/20/Rev.1 para. 97  
57 ibid para. 95 
58 CEDAW Art. 12 (1)  
59 It is worth noting that the CEDAW Committee refers to L.C. as both a woman and a girl, but generally uses the 
word ‘woman’ throughout the decision.  
60 CEDAW, L.C. v. Peru, Communication No 22/2009, UN Doc CEDAW/C/50/D/22/2009 para. 8.14 
61 Charlotte Bates, ‘Abortion and a Right to Health in International Law: L.C. v. Peru’ (2013) 2, 3 Cambridge 
Journal of International and Comparative Law 644 
62 ibid 8.15  
63 ibid 
64 ibid 
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had previously noted in General Recommendation 24 regarding the interrelations of these three 
factors, ‘girl children and adolescent girls are often vulnerable to sexual abuse by older men 
and family members, placing them at risk of physical and psychological harm and unwanted 
and early pregnancy.’65 
 
2.2.3. The right to be from torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment  
In P and S v. Poland, the Court also found that the facts of the case had given rise to a breach 
of Article 3, which enshrines the right to be free torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment. In K.L. v. Peru, the HRC established that the facts revealed a violation of Article 7 
of the ICCPR which provides that ‘no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment’.66  
Although the inclusion in the analysis of the prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment represents indeed a significant shift towards a new way of understanding 
and litigating for adolescent girls’ rights, both cases prove that the use of this absolute 
prohibition in litigation strategies remains underdeveloped. Furthermore, as we will argue in 
Chapter 4, in these cases the decisional bodies have failed to apply an intersectional approach 
regarding adolescent girls’ situation.  
According to well-established jurisprudence and legal doctrine, torture or cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment in order to be considered as such must attain a minimum level of severity. 
The assessment of this ‘‘entry level threshold’’ of severity is therefore relative and depends on 
all the circumstances of the case and of course, of the victim.67 In P and S v. Poland, the 
circumstances that the Court takes into account to evaluate the minimum threshold, are both 
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objective circumstances such as the denial of a lawful medical procedure due to Polish public 
authorities’ ‘procrastination, confusion and lack of proper and objective counselling and 
information’68, the ‘considerable pressure’69 put on P and S by medical staff and clergy 
members or the harassment suffered by both after confidential information about the case was 
relayed to the press70 and subjective circumstances such as her status as a victim of rape, her 
age and consequently, her vulnerability due to these two factors.71 Similarly, in the case of 
K.L., the Human Rights Committee considered diverse objective and subjective circumstances, 
such as the refusal of the medical authorities to carry out the therapeutic abortion, the pain and 
distress caused first by the forced unwanted pregnancy and second by the fact that she had to 
give birth, see her daughter’s deformities and finally watch her die, the medically diagnosed 
state of depression she fell into following the baby’s death and also her age.72  
Both bodies apply what could be named as a ‘‘cumulative’’ approach, in the sense, that, for 
instance, age is just one of the elements they consider in order to establish that her suffering 
had reached the minimum threshold of severity. In Chapter 4 we will see that if we apply an 
intersectional analysis, taking into consideration the, at least, three elements at stake (sex, age 
and pregnancy) the fact that K.L. or P were adolescent girls is sufficient to understand they 
have the right to abortion and thus, the denial of abortion care in their cases, amounts to a 
violation of the right to be free from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, without 
having to consider additional objective or subjective circumstances.  
 
2.2.4. The right to equality and non-discrimination  
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As it has been seen, while at the international, regional and national level there have been 
decisions conceptualising restrictions on abortion as violations of different human rights, there 
have not really been decisions discussing the right to abortion of adolescent girls in the context 
of the prohibition of discrimination.73  
In P and S v. Poland, the Court considered that apart from the violations of Articles 8, 3 and 5 
(right to liberty and security), the materials in its possession did not ‘disclose any appearance 
of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols’.74 Although 
the applicants in their litigation strategy understood there had been a violation of Article 14 of 
the ECHR (prohibition of discrimination) and hoped that the Court would recognise that the 
denial or delay of abortion services is discriminatory, just like in other cases on reproductive 
health services, the Court declined to analyse this aspect or address this claim.75  
In the case of K.L., the authors claimed they have suffered discrimination in breach of Articles 
3 and 26 of the ICCPR in three different forms. First, in her access to health services, because 
according to the authors ‘her different and special needs were ignored because of her sex’76, 
second, in the exercise of her rights and third, in access to the courts, ‘bearing in mind the 
prejudices of officials in the health system and the judicial system where women are concerned 
and the lack of appropriate legal means of enforcing respect for the right to obtain a legal 
abortion when the temporal and other conditions laid down in the law are met.’.77 The HRC, 
however, understood that the claim on discrimination had not been ‘properly substantiated’ 
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given that the author had not ‘placed before the Committee any evidence relating to the events 
which might confirm any type of discrimination under the article in question’.78 
Finally, in the case of L.C. v. Peru, given the CEDAW’s nature and special focus on 
discrimination, the CEDAW Committee evaluated the discriminatory aspects of the case 
finding violations of Articles 12 (equal rights to health services), 5 (freedom from gender 
stereotyping), 3 (right to equality), 2 (c) (legal protection of the rights of women on an equal 
basis with men) and (f) (modification or abolition of existing laws, regulations, customs and 
practices which constitute discrimination against women). Nevertheless, two critiques should 
be made. Firstly, in this decision the Committee applied what Ngwena called a ‘‘limited 
equality paradigm’’ mainly because it framed women’s equality essentially as a procedural and 
not substantive equality.79 In this sense, ‘it stops short of a more holistic consideration of the 
impact of abortion laws on women in a gendered society’.80 Secondly, it does not really apply 
an intersectional approach, as in general, it refers to women’s discrimination. Age and 
pregnancy appear to be either isolated categories or cumulative categories that simply 
aggravate a given situation. This becomes apparent, for instance, when the Committee states 
‘owing to her condition as a pregnant woman, L.C. dis not have access to an effective and 
accessible procedure (…) This is even more serious considering that she was a minor and a 
victim of sexual abuse’.81  
We will undertake a thorough analysis of intersectional discrimination in Chapter 3 and 4, 
ultimately arguing that the prohibition of discrimination should be key in a litigation strategy 
advancing adolescent girls’ right to abortion.  
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2.2.5. The right to life  
The right to life has been invoked to support opposing claims, some to support foetuses’ ‘‘right 
to life’’ and others to support women and girls’ right to life.82  
According to the Guttmacher Institute, an estimate range of 22.800–31.000 women died after 
undergoing an unsafe and clandestine abortion.83 Consolidated research indicated then that 
there is a strong correlation between abortion safety and abortion legality.84 In General 
Comment 28, the HRC urged States parties to ‘give information on any measures taken by the 
State to help women prevent unwanted pregnancies and to ensure that they do not have to 
undergo life-threatening clandestine abortions’.85 In a much more recent General Comment, 
the HRC has even declared that States parties ‘must provide safe, legal and effective access to 
abortion where the life and health of the pregnant woman or girl is at risk’.86 
In K.L. v. Peru, an interesting discussion regarding the right to life was generated. The HRC in 
its decision did not consider there had been a breach of Article 6 of the ICCPR, protecting the 
right to life. The HRC argued that due to them finding a violation on the prohibition of torture 
or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, they did not consider it necessary in these 
circumstances to made a finding on Article 6.  
Nonetheless, in his dissenting opinion, Committee Member Hipólito Solari-Yrigoyen sustained 
that the case of K.L. revealed a violation of the right to life. Taking a brave stance, he claimed 
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that ‘it is not only taking a person’s life that violates article 6 of the Covenant but also placing 
a person’s life in grave danger, as in this case’.87  
So far, no decisional body has ever analysed the issue of abortion and more specifically the 
denial and restrictions on abortion services as a violation on the right to life, a right which has 
historically been the cornerstone of anti-abortion movement’s rhethorical and legislative 
strategy.   
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3. THEORETICAL REVIEW ON THE INTERSECTION BETWEEN SEX, AGE AND 
PREGNANCY IN RELATION TO ABORTION  
This chapter will offer a brief theoretical review on how feminist legal theory and childhood 
studies have considered and analysed in relation to abortion the intersectional discrimination 
based on the grounds of sex, age and pregnancy. This does not mean, however, that we will not 
acknowledge or evaluate other grounds of discrimination, such as race or poverty, but we will 
focus primarily on the three ones we mentioned.  
Three topics have been selected for the purposes of this dissertation. First, we will explore the 
definition of intersectionality. Second, we will analyse the social and cultural construction of 
girls’ sexuality and its relation to reproduction and pregnancy. Finally, the third section will 
focus on the complex relationship between the State, parents and adolescent pregnant girls and 
how this relationship is sometimes redefined when adolescent girls get pregnant and when they 
decide to get an abortion.  
 
3.1. Understanding intersectionality  
The notion of intersectionality was originated in gender and post-colonial studies, although it 
was coined by American legal scholar Kimberle Crenshaw.88 She explored how the experiences 
of black women, situated at the margins of race and gender, were insufficiently and 
inadequately represented in both the feminist and antiracist discourse. Her point of departure 
was the opposition to the ‘‘single-axis framework’’ according to which race and gender were 
considered two exclusive categories of experience and analysis.89 The relevant and defining 
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experiences of discrimination were those of white women or black men, excluding black 
women’s intersectional experiences not as man or as black but as black women.  
Discrimination categories or grounds such as sex, age, poverty, sexual orientation or race 
interact with each other. They can ‘mutually strengthen or weaken each other’90. Intersectional 
discrimination therefore focuses on the interwoven nature of these discrimination categories.91 
Girls, for example, are marginalised ‘within the category of children as females, and within the 
category of women as minors’.92 According to Taefi, this is because ‘the experience of 
adulthood defines what it means to be a woman and the experience of being male what it is to 
be a child’.93 If the discourse around women’s rights is adult-centred, girls’ needs and interests 
are relegated to the margins, creating a ‘distorted analysis of the experience of childhood, 
because it is grounded in the assumption that boys and girls face oppression in an identical 
way’.94  
A clear link between women’s rights and children’s rights has been recognised by both feminist 
theory and childhood studies. Backstrom indicates that even though women’s and children’s 
rights may be connected, there is ‘a tendency to disassociate [them] because they are viewed 
as undermining each other’.95 For Prince-Cohen children’s rights discourse, prominently 
focused on children’s protection, represents in a way a threat to the adult woman’s autonomy96, 
who is ‘in danger of being tainted with children’s dependency and either being infantilised by 
the connection or suppressed in the name of the child.’97 
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While addressing women’s rights and children’s rights separately can benefit each of these 
groups, it is also important to acknowledge the existing interconnectedness of these rights98, 
especially if we are applying an intersectional approach to analyse girls’ rights violations.  
Grillo points that one of the key lessons of intersectionality is that diverse ‘oppressions cannot 
be dismantled separately because they mutually reinforce each other’.99 Although this 
illustrates the enormous difficulties that exist in operationalising intersectionality, in Chapter 
4 we will analyse intersectional discrimination in the case at hand aiming to understand the 
different interactions between three specific discrimination grounds: age, sex and pregnancy.  
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3.2. Social and cultural construction of girls’ sexuality  
The concept of childhood, at least as it has been understood since the 19th century, has been 
premised upon an idea of sexual innocence.100 The child and especially the girl child, is 
essentially good and pure. Childhood is essentially ‘constructed in opposition to a dangerous 
and potentially corrupting adult world’.101 At the same time, especially in the case of girls, 
some have argued that we are witnessing a whole process of  ‘‘erotisation’’ or ‘‘sexualisation’’, 
sometimes referred to as the premature or hyper-sexualisation of girls.102 Girls thus ‘appear 
simultaneously as innocent and sexually knowing’103, becoming ‘the most perfect object of 
male desire’.104 This ambivalent image has been significantly encouraged by the media, art and 
popular culture.105 A good example can be the novel Lolita by Vladimir Nabokov. The 
protagonist and narrator of this novel, a middle-aged man named Humbert, describes his 
obsession with a 12-year-old girl and the sexual relationship they have.  
Even though the situation differs for different groups, the majority of teenage girls are in the 
same ‘anomalous position of being at one infantilised by the cult of virginity (codified, for 
example, in statutory rape and ‘‘age of consent’’ laws) and objectified by the media’s cult of 
‘‘Lolita’’.106 As Walkerdine puts it 
‘popular images of little girls as alluring and seductive, at once innocent and highly 
erotic, are contained in the most respectable and mundane of locations […] This is not 
about a few perverts, but about the complex construction of the highly contradictory 
gaze at little girls, one which places them as at once threatening and sustaining 
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rationality, little virgins that might be whores, to be protected yet to be constantly 
alluring’.107 
Just as childhood, adolescence, generally understood as a transitional phase between childhood 
and adulthood, is a culturally constructed concept. In said phase, rites of initiation become 
crucial.108 Exploring sexuality is undoubtedly one of these rites of initiation. For Kehily and 
Montgomery adolescence is a ‘time when there is a struggle for control over a young woman’s 
sexuality and her fertility’.109 Polland Petchesky argues that pregnancy, an undeniable and 
visible sign of sexual initiation, is in itself a way to explore the boundaries between childhood 
and adulthood.110 These two notions have been historically exclusively conceptualised.111 Put 
simply, you are either a child or an adult. Teenage pregnancy challenges this distinction. It can 
be seen therefore as a ‘contradiction in terms’.112 How does then the image of a pregnant 
adolescent girl differ from the image of a non-pregnant girl? As Murcott points, to be sexually 
active and consequently sexually knowledgeable is to have lost innocence, the very essence of 
childhood. ‘A girl’s pregnancy is proof of her loss of innocence, and thereby raises doubts 
about her status as a child’.113 After all, how can a child be a mother?  
It is important to note that, despite the common ‘‘Western’’ assumption about sexuality as a 
biologically determined phenomenon114, ideas about girls’ sexuality are ‘closely tied to ideas 
about the body, about gender relationships and about the culturally sanctioned expression of 
sexuality.’115  
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Gender clearly ‘shapes attitudes and behaviours related to sexuality by the different norms and 
expectations it imparts on young women and young men’.116 Gender norms therefore influence 
ideas about sexuality, reproduction and motherhood or parenthood in opposite directions, while 
boys are considered to be ‘‘naturally’’ predisposed and prepared for sex, they are not prepared 
to become fathers, and while girls are not sexually driven and active, they can make sacrificed 
and selfless mothers.117 Research has also shown that many girls have been socialised to accept 
male control of sexual activities and decision-making 118 and that rigid gender norms reinforce 
violence towards them.  
The existing ambivalence towards girls’ sexuality helps us understand first and foremost girls’ 
forms of sexual expression, some of which are clearly modelled after media images of girls’ 
and women’s sexuality119 and markedly influenced by defined gender roles and norms. It also 
helps us understand the sexual behaviour and attitudes of others and their ideas about 
pregnancy and abortion.  
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3.3. Power imbalances: The exercise of choice in regard to abortion  
Pregnancy and abortion redefine albeit in different ways the interrelations between the State, 
parents and adolescent girls.  
A lot of adolescent girls, and more specifically those who live with their parents, are inevitably 
‘influenced by their parents’ power over them and control of their time, resources and 
future.’120 Precisely because of their dependence on their parents, pregnancy and abortion can 
be a critical struggle for power between adolescent girls and their parents.121 Abortion care can 
be thus understood, just as for instance, sex education or access to contraceptive methods, as a 
site for the recognition not only of sexual desire but also of adolescent girls’ sexual and 
reproductive agency.122 Giddens, although referring to the much broader concept of sexuality, 
understands sexuality as a ‘terrain of fundamental political struggle and also a medium of 
emancipation’.123  
Article 5 of the CRC places parents centre stage. It provides that ‘States Parties shall respect 
the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents or other persons legally responsible for the 
child, to provide, in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child, appropriate 
direction and guidance in the exercise [of his or her rights]’. Article 5 anticipates that parents 
‘will invariably be making decisions on behalf of their children given that children will often 
lack the capacity to determine their best interests.’124  
Parental involvement laws regarding abortion are an expression of the principle of parental 
guidance or parental authority. There are essentially two categories of parental involvement 
laws which are parental consent and parental notification standards. Parental consent laws 
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require girls to obtain consent by one or both parents before abortion services are provided. 
Parental notification laws require written notification to parents before the medical provider 
can perform the procedure.  Proponents of this type of laws have argued that these requirements 
have reduced unwanted pregnancy rates and that excluding parents from their daughters’ 
decision to seek an abortion would otherwise harm them.125 Another arguments which have 
been recurrently raised have been that parental involvement will result in better family 
communication and a more reasoned decision-making process.126 Research has shown, 
nevertheless, that most parental involvement laws have little impact on girls’ abortion rate127 
and that they have also no effect on a girl’s decision to talk with her parents about her pregnancy 
and her decision prior to having an abortion.128 In fact, the determining factor in these cases 
was the relationship the adolescent girl had with her parents.129 Furthermore, in certain cases, 
imposing parental involvement can lead to violence and some girls can be forced to continue 
with unwanted pregnancies.130 The most frequent reasons for not telling their parents include 
‘the desire to protect a vulnerable parent from stress and disappointment, the belief that the 
knowledge would damage their relationship with the parent, and the fear that disclosure would 
escalate conflict or coercion’.131 
Although parents play indeed a vital role in the realisation of girls’ rights (and the right to 
abortion is no exception) and the family in the CRC is considered to be a ‘fundamental group 
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of society and the natural environment for the growth and well-being of all its members and 
particularly children’132, Article 5 and the Convention in general, deal with children’s rights 
not parental rights.  
First, parents must provide what Article 5 qualifies as ‘‘appropriate’’ direction and guidance. 
This basically means, in accordance with the principle of consistency, that said direction and 
guidance will only be appropriate when it is consistent with the rest of provisions of the CRC. 
Second, parental direction and guidance ‘must have a nexus with the ability of a [girl] to 
progressively enjoy [her] rights in light of [her] evolving capacities’.133 The principle of the 
evolving capacities of the girl must definitely be taken into consideration when analysing 
parental authority, as it has become an essential enabling, interpretative and policy principle 
under international child law.134 The introduction of this notion of ‘‘evolving capacities’’ 
alongside the general principle enshrined in Article 12 in the CRC (the right to be heard and 
have their views taken into consideration), has ‘challenged the entrenched perception of the 
child as an object of protection and introduced the prospect of the child as a rights-holder under 
international law’.135 Just as Lansdown observes the principle of evolving capacities created a 
direct relationship between the State and the child, not mediated by their parents, making the 
child visible as a subject of rights within the family.136 To a certain extent it could be said that 
he acknowledgement of a child’s partial independence from adult protection has significantly 
blurred the line of division between adulthood and childhood, as it ‘introduces an evolutionary 
understanding of competence and maturity, and, therefore, produces exactly a ‘grey zone’ 
identified above’.137 
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In the case of abortion, the State must be able to strike a balance between two different duties 
as it must protect adolescent girls from violence while simultaneously recognizing the sexual 
autonomy of girls who are just beginning to explore and experience their sexuality.138 Cases 
like Gillick139, which established the means by which to assess the legal capacity of a girl under 
the age of 16 to consent to medical treatment, ‘pointed towards the possibility of transforming 
the complex relationship between the State, parents and the child to the benefit of the child and 
of emancipating the individual child from a sacred, private sphere of family life that left little 
room for public intervention and potential protection of the child and his or her rights’140  
Mandatory parental involvement in adolescent girls’ decision to seek an abortion increases the 
risk of harm by delaying access to appropriate medical care and can also have adverse health, 
psychological and social impact.141 Ideally, of course, when facing the decision to undergo an 
abortion an adolescent girl will seek the advice of those who care for her the most, but should 
do so voluntarily.  
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4. BUILDING AN ALTERNATIVE LITIGATION STRATEGY: THE DENIAL OR 
RESTRICTIONS ON ABORTION CARE AS A FORM OF TORTURE OR OTHER 
CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT AND AN ACT OF 
INTERSECTIONAL DISCRIMINATION  
In the first section of this chapter, the main aim is to analyse the different elements of an 
alternative and adaptable legal framework which incorporates an intersectional approach to 
girls’ abortion rights. The key elements of this legal framework, which would be present in 
every legal strategy we design, are the prohibition against torture or other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment, the prohibition discrimination and the girl’s best interests’ principle. Each 
of these elements will be separately and thoroughly considered.  
In the second section of the chapter, we will test the application of this theoretical framework 
and reimagine the rulings that were previously analysed in Chapter 2 which embodied the 
traditional approach to litigation strategy in adolescent girls’ abortion rights cases.  
 
4.1. Prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment  
Simone de Beauvoir once wrote that ‘the representation of the world as the world itself is the 
work of adult men; they describe it from a point of view that is their own and that they confound 
with the absolute truth.”142 (Italics are mine). Law, and more specifically international law is 
no exception to this assertion. Adult men have for centuries defined our systems of rules and 
their rules have been equated to neutral and objective rules. After underlying the pervasiveness 
of gendered assumptions in domestic legal systems143, feminist legal critique has strongly 
argued that international law is too a ‘thoroughly gendered system’.144 It has attempted to show, 
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as Chinkin points, how the ‘structures, processes and methodologies of international law 
marginalise women by failing to take into account of their lives or experiences’.145  
If we take the example of the prohibition of torture not only the gendered nature of international 
human rights law becomes apparent but we can also see that it has been conceptualised in a 
very adult-centric way.  
While it has been traditionally associated with the paradigm of interrogation, intimidation or 
punishment committed against detainees by State actors in State-run facilities, the concept of 
torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment has considerably expanded in recent 
decades.146 Human rights bodies have begun to consider certain situations or cases of violence, 
such as domestic violence or female genital mutilation to fall inside the scope of the prohibition 
of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.147 
Following the definition of torture contained in the Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), we will now proceed to 
examine all its elements in order to understand how to challenge the adult and male-centric 
conceptualisation of the prohibition of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
present in both legal and popular imagination148 and to ultimately be able to apply the definition 
of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment to those cases in which adolescent 
girls who have clearly manifested their decision to end their pregnancies are denied this 
possibility or find difficulties in accessing abortion care.  
 
4.1.1. Elements of the definition of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment  
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The absolute prohibition of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment is a rule of 
jus cogens, a peremptory rule of international which cannot be modified even by treaty.149 This 
prohibition is guaranteed by different international and regional human rights treaties and it is 
considered customary international law.150 As Rodley points, indicators of this are ‘the fact that 
the rule is couched in absolute terms, brooking no exception […], the non-derogability of the 
rule even in time of war or other public emergency and the fact that states do not claim a right 
to torture’.151 So, CAT is based on the presumption of ‘the existing prohibition under 
international and national law of the practice of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.’152  
Article 5 of the UDHR provides that ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment’. Article 7 of the ICCPR has followed the exact same 
wording. In addition to its inclusion in a general human rights treaty, the prohibition of torture 
and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment has been established in the CAT, a treaty which can 
be considered the backbone of the international structure for combating torture and cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment.153 Article 1 of said convention sets out the generally 
recognised and accepted definition of torture, according to which ‘‘torture’’ means  
 
‘[…] any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third 
person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has 
committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third 
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person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or 
suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a 
public official or other person acting in an official capacity’.  
 
4.1.1.1. Act of severe pain or suffering  
If the definition of torture requires an ‘‘act’’, our first essential question is necessarily if an 
omission constitutes an act? Can restrictions on abortion services be considered an act of severe 
pain or suffering then? Doctrine and jurisprudence both have agreed that indeed the 
requirement for an act of torture includes omissions. Herman Burgers and Danelius, for 
instance, indicate the fact that the definition explicitly refers to acts, ‘this does not exclude, 
however, that in special cases an omission should be assimilated to an act’.154 
The CAT, ICCPR and ECHR all recognise that torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment involves acts that inflict severe pain or suffering on the victim.155 The act or omission 
must attain thus a certain level of severity. This notion, nonetheless, is ‘both inherently 
subjective and inherently vague’.156 The assessment of this threshold of severity has been made 
taking into consideration both objective and subjective factors.157 When adolescent pregnant 
girls have expressed their clear wish to terminate their pregnancies the denial or imposition of 
barriers to accessing abortion care constitutes a form of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment 
given the biological, psychological and socioeconomic effects associated to child pregnancy. 
These effects will be explored more closely in subsection 4.1.2. Due to all these reasons, which 
undoubtedly make adolescent pregnant girls extremely vulnerable to experiencing torture or 
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other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment when accessing abortion services, we argue that 
no other circumstances should be taken into consideration. The subjective and intersectional 
experience of an unwanted pregnancy adolescent pregnant girls experience is sufficient to 
qualify the act of denying or restricting girls’ access to abortion care as torture or cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment. Other objective factors could be only considered in order to 
establish whether the act in itself constitutes either a form of torture or a form of other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment.158  
 
4.1.1.2. Intention and purpose  
Just as Article 1 of the CAT establishes, in order to ascertain that certain acts or omissions 
amount to torture, it is necessary to prove that these were ‘‘intentionally inflicted’’ on the 
victims. If a State legally or practically restricts adolescent girls’ access to abortion, for 
instance, establishing parental involvement laws, can we say said State intended to cause severe 
pain or suffering? The CAT Committee has adopted a broad conception of the meaning of 
intention, only affirming that ‘‘intentionally’’ excludes negligent conduct.159 In General 
Comment 2, the Committee stated that both elements, intent and purpose, ‘do not involve a 
subjective inquiry into the motivations of the perpetrators, but rather must be objective 
determinations under the circumstances’.160  
Apart from being intentionally inflicted, the pain or suffering must be inflicted for one of the 
purposes the article enumerates. Among the different purposes in Article 1, the one that can be 
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clearly identified with the situations we are analysing is discrimination. Just as Sifris asserts, 
the adoption of a discrimination-based approach to conceptualising restrictions on abortion, for 
both women and girls, is gaining momentum although quite slowly.161 As we will explain on 
next section, restricting or denying access to abortion services is a form of intersectional 
discrimination that severely affects adolescent pregnant girls’ right to abortion.  
 
4.1.1.3 The public official requirement  
During the travaux préparatoires of the CAT, there was some debate concerning whether the 
definition of torture should be strictly limited to ‘‘public officials’’ or whether it should also 
include private individuals acting in a private capacity within the jurisdiction of the State party. 
In the end, a compromise was reached that resulted in the current wording of the definition of 
torture contained in Article 1162, which, in essence, provides that a State may be held 
responsible for an act of torture if it is intentionally inflicted by either a public official or a 
private actor with the consent or at the instigation of a public official. In the case of abortion 
rights, a direct link can be found between legal restrictions on abortion services and the pain or 
suffering experienced by adolescent pregnant girls wishing to end their pregnancies. States are 
‘directly involved in the passing of legislation and in general, in the absence of a declaration 
that a law is unconstitutional, the machinery of investigation and prosecution function so as to 
enforce such a law’.163  
Even though the CAT Committee has not addressed any claims regarding the specific question 
of whether legislative restrictions on abortion services contravene the Convention, the UN 
Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 
remarked that minorities and marginalised groups and individuals, such as adolescent pregnant 
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girls, are particularly vulnerable to be subject to torture in the healthcare context.164 A direct 
link can be thus found between not only the State and the pain or suffering girls must endure 
when their access to abortion services is hindered or denied but also between such pain or 
suffering and the medical personnel who essentially are persons ‘acting on behalf of the State, 
in conjunction with the State, under its direction or control or otherwise under colour of law’.165  
 
4.1.1.4. The ‘‘powerlessness’’ requirement 
Despite not being stated as one of the requirements or elements of the above definition of 
torture, leading international human rights commentators, such as Nowak, Special Rapporteur 
on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment from 2004 to 2010, 
consider that torture ‘presupposes a situation of powerlessness of the victim’.166  
While it cannot be understood that the CAT Committee regards the element of 
‘‘powerlessness’’ of the victim as an implicit requirement, a brief analysis of the case law of 
CAT allows us to see that this element ‘at least increases the likelihood of conduct constituting 
torture’ and has therefore become a relevant consideration.167 The HRC, by contrast, has more 
clearly linked torture to abuse of power. It is true that it has not gone ‘so far as to explicitly 
require that ‘powerlessness’ of the victim be established for conduct to constitute torture [but] 
it has expressed the view that a power imbalance is necessary for conduct to amount to 
torture’.168 
In the case of adolescent pregnant girls, the ‘‘powerlessness’’ requirement becomes an 
interesting element of discussion to fully understand and frame restrictions on abortion services 
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within the prohibition of torture. The traditional conception of adolescent pregnant girls as 
objects of protection, instead of subjects of rights, coupled with their subordinated position 
within the family and societal structures, given their age, sex and pregnancy, place them ‘under 
the total control of another person(s)’.169 Restrictions on abortion services ‘take away the 
individual decision-making and legal capacity of individual [girls] rendering them 
powerless’.170 The three primary factors that contribute to rendering them in said state are the 
power of the law, the power of the medical profession and the power of parental authority. 
Adolescent pregnant girls’ multi-level dependence on their parents or caregivers, the State or 
sometimes both operate to create imbalances of power in the relationship between the torturer 
and the tortured.171  
 
4.1.2. Framing restrictions on adolescent pregnant girls’ right to abortion as a form of torture 
or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
Once the different elements of the definition have been explored, we will now examine the 
adverse consequences associated with forced child pregnancy. The different effects forced 
child pregnancy can have on adolescent girls’ health, development and lives is the basis for 
arguing that the denial or restrictions on abortion care for adolescent pregnant girls constitutes 
an act of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.  
 
4.1.2.1. Health consequences  
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According to the WHO, in developing regions about 16 million adolescent girls (ages 15 to 19 
years) and 2.5 million adolescent girls under 16 years old give birth every year.172 On a global 
scale, possible complications during pregnancy and childbirth are the leading causes of death 
for adolescent girls.173 Adolescent pregnant girls are indeed disproportionally affected by 
maternal mortality.174 Given its magnitude, teenage pregnancy has been identified as major 
public health problem.  
Even though it has been argued that health problems are more associated to older adolescent 
girls and that significant differences exist between high-income and low- and middle-income 
countries which are generally characterised by poor healthcare services175, studies have shown 
that adolescent mothers face increased risks of puerperal endometritis, eclampsia and systemic 
infections than young women aged 20 to 24 years old. Adolescent pregnant girls are also more 
likely to develop pregnancy-related high blood pressure and anaemia.176Adolescent pregnancy 
has long-term health consequences, as it has been demonstrated that in general, adolescent 
mothers exhibit poorer physical health in later life than other groups of older women.177 
Complications in teenage pregnancies are 50% more likely than average to occur requiring 
emergency intervention, such as therapeutic abortion.178  
Adolescent pregnancies also have a negative impact on the health and well-being of new-born 
babies. Especially in low- and middle-income countries, a rather significant increase in the 
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prevalence of preterm delivery, risks of low birth weight and severe neonatal conditions has 
been noted.179  
As Kooijmans claims, torture ‘is the violations par excellence of the physical and mental 
integrity’.180 This means there is an indissoluble interdependence between physical and mental 
health. There is a clear psychological impact of adolescent pregnancies. Some researches have 
found that adolescent pregnant girls suffer postpartum depression at a rate that is twice as high 
as women who are 25 or older.181 Adolescent mothers also face important levels of stress and 
anxiety and have higher rates of suicidal ideation than other women of different age groups.182  
 
4.1.2.3. Socioeconomic and educational consequences 
It has been affirmed that adolescent pregnancy is a ‘socially inflicted health hazard’.183 What 
this means is that it is actually very difficult to dissociate health consequences from social and 
economic consequences when discussing the phenomenon of teenage pregnancy. Some studies 
have even gone as far as saying that ‘adverse health consequences and poor pregnancy outcome 
among teenage mothers seem not to be associated with low gynaecological or chronological 
age of the mothers but with adverse life circumstances’184, making adolescent pregnancy not a 
clinic problem but a primarily a social one. 
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Adolescent pregnancy has negative socioeconomic effects on girls, their families and 
communities.185 It is a perpetuation of the widening gap in health and social inequalities.186  
In certain contexts, there is a direct link between child marriage and early childbirths; in some 
cases, teenage pregnancy and childbirth may be the consequence for child marriage while in 
others marriage may result from an early pregnancy or childbirth.187 Whereas married 
adolescent girls face an increased risk of intimate partner violence188, unmarried adolescents 
may face stigma or rejection by their parents, peers or communities and threats of violence.189  
Furthermore, especially in certain regions like Latin America, adolescent pregnant girls are 
disproportionally affected by sexual violence within the family environment and outside.190  
Adolescent pregnancy is significantly associated with lower education attainment. Especially 
in early teens, adolescent mothers experience greater difficulties in realising their life plans191 
and often perpetuate cycles of poverty.192 School disruption directly impacts on the 
development of skills and consequently on their employment prospects.193  
It has also been reported that children of adolescent mothers are at risk in terms of social and 
economic development.194  
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4.2. Prohibition of discrimination  
Intersectionality is very difficult to operationalise and in spite of this fact, the attempt in this 
dissertation has been to try and understand the interactions of, at least, three discrimination 
grounds which are: age, sex and pregnancy. One might think that sex and pregnancy are closely 
tied and that perhaps we should be discussing age and sex as discrimination grounds, but cis 
women and cis girls, even though they are the majority and clearly more visible, are not the 
only ones who need and get abortions. Different people across the gender spectrum, such as 
intersex people, non-binary people or transgender men, might need to access abortion services 
too.  
It is true that experiences in relation to abortion are different from one person to another. It is 
indeed a very personal experience. Nonetheless, age, sex and pregnancy have the potential to 
create and define shared experiences among adolescent pregnant girls, given the fact that they 
have the potential to ‘‘vulnerabilise’’ them and in many cases, they do.  
For MacKinnon, the legal system has not adequately conceptualised pregnancy essentially 
because ‘the social conception of pregnancy that has formed the basis for its legal treatment 
has not been from the point of view of the pregnant woman [or girl], but rather from the point 
of view of the observing outsider [adult] gendered male’.195 As a consequence, pregnancy and 
abortion have been understood, defined and regulated from an adult and male perspective. 
When access to abortion services is denied by either legal barriers or practical barriers or 
hindered by, for instance, establishing mandatory parental consent laws, adolescent pregnant 
girls are targeted and discriminated against. Laws restricting abortion have the effect and 
purpose of preventing adolescent girls from exercising their rights on basis of equality with 
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boys and men. On this basis, we strongly argue that the right to equality and to be free from 
discrimination is essential in building an alternative litigation strategy.  
Historically it can be said that there has been an overly large focus on formal equality. Formal 
equality involves equality of treatment, rather than equality of results. That is why in dealing 
with discrimination cases, a typical test is applied by judicial or quasi-judicial bodies in order 
to determine if someone was treated less favourably than a comparator because of his or her 
specific characteristics.196 But when referring to adolescent pregnant girls accessing abortion 
services, how can a comparator be found? Who can be considered to be similarly situated?  
Formal equality seeks to ‘combat direct discrimination by treating persons in a similar situation 
similarly and persons in different situations differently [whereas] substantive equality seeks to 
address structural and indirect discrimination and takes into account power relations’.197  
Moving beyond formal equality and understanding structural discrimination is key to evaluate 
how adolescent pregnant girls are targeted and discriminated against when access to abortion 
services is denied or hindered. Gender and age are used to structure the experiences of people 
in social life and the entrenchment of gender and age-related norms in law and other social 
institutions help us explain why some forms of sex discrimination and age discrimination are 
so persistent and pervasive.198  
As Siegel points, abortion restrictions are clearly ‘gender-biased in justification and 
structure’199 in the sense that they create and reinforce certain roles girls are expected to fulfil 
in society. They are in essence a way of controlling girls’ sexuality and reproductive capacities. 
In addition, some of these restrictions, such as parental involvement laws, have a 
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discriminatory purpose as they undermine girls’ capacity to make decisions about their bodies 
and lives. Forced motherhood certainly deprives girls of control over timing of motherhood 
and exacerbate the inequalities in educational, economic and political life.200  
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4.3. The girl’s best interests’ principle  
Article 3 of the CRC introduces the best interests’ principle. It specifically provides that ‘[i]n 
all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare 
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of 
the child shall be a primary consideration’. Logically, the questions that immediately arises, 
and even more so in the context of reproductive freedom, is who defines what is best for 
adolescent girls?  
One of the multiple ways in which the CRC has tried to find promote girls’ autonomy has been 
by granting Article 12, which enshrines the right to be heard and taken into consideration, 
sometimes called the principle of participation, and Article 3 the same legal status for both are 
general principles of the Convention. This essentially implies that as general principles of the 
Convention, the interpretation and implementation of all other rights in said instrument are 
guided by them. Consequently, protection and autonomy cannot be seen as completely 
opposing concepts. As the Committee pinpoints there is ‘a complementary role of the two 
general principles’.201 Article 3 must be interpreted in light of Article 12 and vice versa. They 
are mutually reinforcing principles. Protection becomes ‘necessary in order to develop 
autonomy and autonomy is necessary to ensure protection’.202 Eekelar develops the concept of 
‘‘dynamic self-determinism’’ to describe the synergy between both concepts. For this author, 
the best interests’ principle can only be respected if we allow scope for children to determine 
what their interests are.203 The best interest of a pregnant adolescent girl who faces the decision 
between abortion and childbirth should always be therefore determined with her participation.  
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There is an ongoing debate as to whether the foetus is human for the purposes of international 
law, and consequently as to whether the best interests’ principle should be applied when 
referring to the ‘‘unborn child’’.204 Anti-choice campaigners and analysts have recurrently 
argued that this principle should apply to the ‘‘unborn child’’ on the ground that the Preamble 
of the Convention explicitly says that ‘by reason of his physical and mental immaturity, needs 
special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protection, before as well as after 
birth’.205 To cite just an example, Joseph claims that jurisdictions which decriminalise abortion 
‘discriminate against children before birth, denying them a right to survival and development 
and having the intended dire outcome for these children of arbitrary deprivation of life’.206 She 
further asserts that in consequence, in these jurisdictions ‘the best interests of the child principle 
was not a primary consideration in the decision to enact such legislative changes’.207  
Nonetheless, Article 1, the provision of the Convention dealing with the definition of what 
constitutes a ‘‘child’’, only sets an upper age limit. It establishes then that ‘[f]or the purposes 
of the present Convention, a child means every human being below the age of eighteen years 
unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier’. Despite the 
Convention’s textual ambiguity, numerous scholars consider that the right of the mother in 
international law supersedes the right to life of an unborn child under the Convention.208 Alston 
does not go as far as to affirm this, but recognises that according the status of child to the foetus 
would be to attribute to the preamble an importance considerably in excess of that which may 
reasonably be accorded to such broad policy pronouncements’.209  
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This debate, which is actually far from finished, often takes on a ‘dualistic, binary nature 
positioning a woman against a foetus, and result in what has been described as a zero-sum 
game attitude to recognition in abortion rights debates’.210 That is why, in the abortion debate, 
anti-choice advocates, when referring to the best interests’ principle, have considered it applies 
to the unborn child. But how does the situation change when a girl wants to have an abortion? 
The debate then is not framed then in terms of a woman vs. an unborn child, but instead as a 
child vs. an unborn child.  
In a matter such as this, that clearly and directly affects adolescent girls, the best interests’ 
principle dictates that her interests and her decisions should be the primary consideration. In 
accordance, the State should guarantee their right to abortion. To consider girls’ interests as a 
primary consideration in its action, the State should guarantee access to abortion services.  
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4.4. Litigating intersectionality: reimagining the analysed case law  
After having analysed the elements that compose our litigation strategy, we consider it could 
be quite interesting to test its application to the already existing cases concerning adolescent 
girls’ abortion rights. When trying to conduct any strategic litigation, we should first consider 
the effectiveness of the forum we intend to litigate in. This decision is indeed crucial for the 
development and outcome of the whole process.  
Leaving the case of K.L. v Peru aside, the other two the cases that were previously analysed in 
Chapter 2, were brought to the ECtHR and the CEDAW Committee. Given that the violations 
of human rights defined earlier (prohibition of torture, prohibition of discrimination and girls’ 
best interests) clearly influences our choice of legal fora, neither the ECtHR nor the CEDAW 
Committee would be appropriate to bring these cases. The CEDAW Committee has a limited 
scope as it does not contain any provisions regarding the prohibition of torture and the ECtHR 
does not contain a stand-alone provision on discrimination since Article 14 of the ECHR which 
introduces the right to be free from discrimination, prohibits discrimination only in relation to 
the exercise of other rights guaranteed by the ECHR. Having discarded these two fora, 
choosing an appropriate forum may depend on several of the following circumstances:  
1. Region. Depending on the case and the country, one might find regional jurisdictions 
available. In the case of P and S v. Poland, the ECtHR could seem at first as a valid 
option given the fact that in Europe rulings from the ECtHR are binding and 
enforceable. However, this system impedes us from tackling the structural and 
intersectional discrimination adolescent pregnant girls face when accessing abortion 
care.  
2. Effective application of the proposed litigation framework. If we consider the three 
elements, the options boil down to two: The Human Rights Committee and the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child. If the cases had been brought to the Human 
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Rights Committee the claims would have focused on Article 7 (the right to be free from 
torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment), Article 26 and 2(1) (prohibition 
of discrimination) and Article 24 (special protection afforded to minors). If the cases 
had been brought to the Committee on the Rights of the Child the claims would have 
focused on Article 37 (prohibition of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment), Article 2 (prohibition of discrimination) and Article 3 (best interests of the 
child).  
3. More political impact and influence. It is true that the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child is the most widely ratified human rights treaty, but the Human Rights Committee, 
given the historical prevalence of civil and political rights and the importance of the 
ICCPR if compared with other international human rights instruments, could be 
expected to have more influence on State behaviour.  
The Human Rights Committee presents itself as an adequate legal forum to bring the cases we 
analysed to and it would have probably been the most effective one.   
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5. CONCLUSION  
Just as Charlesworth, Chinkin and Wright affirm ‘long-term domination of all bodies wielding 
political power nationally and internationally means that issues traditionally of concern to men 
become seen as general human concerns, while "women's concerns" are relegated to a special, 
limited category’.211 If women’s concerns are relegated to a limited category, adolescent 
pregnant girls’ concerns are not even considered. At the intersections or at the margins is were 
those who are generally considered invisible exist. In other words, due to the intersection of 
two or more prohibited grounds of discrimination in relation to abortion, certain groups suffer 
more than others. Such discrimination ‘has a unique and specific impact on individuals and 
merits particular consideration and remedying’.212 
In order to make the invisible visible it is crucial to reframe and reinterpret international human 
rights law. Our focus in this dissertation has been to advance adolescent girls’ right to abortion 
through strategic litigation, a tool we consider fundamental and quite powerful.  
Given adolescent girls’ dependency and vulnerability, the traditional approach to abortion 
rights litigation based on privacy or autonomy and designed primarily for adult women, cannot 
be considered appropriate to frame and litigate for adolescent girls’ rights. In an (adult) man’s 
world where the so-called pro-life movement has precisely co-opted the right to life, we need 
stronger legal bases.  
Even though the right to abortion has been historically conceptualised as part of other already 
enshrined human rights, we propose its denial or restrictions should be understood as a 
violation of the right to be free from torture or other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment, the right to be free from discrimination and the girl’s best interests.  
                                                 
211 Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin and Shelley Wright, ‘Feminist Approaches to International Law’ 
(1991) 85, 4 The American Journal of International Law 625 
212 CESCR, General Comment No. 20 Non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural rights (art. 2, para. 2, 
of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) (2 July 2009) UN Doc E/C.12/GC/20 
para. 17  
 55 
We firmly believe and hope this legal framework can be applied to different litigation strategies 
and that it contributes to recognising and realising adolescent girls’ right to abortion.  
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